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V.

Montague, 55 N.J.

387, 262 A.2d 398 (1970).
Defendant was convicted of threatening the life of a police officer
and of assault and battery on the officer.1 He appealed, and the superior court, appellate division, reversed and remanded.2 On review,
the supreme court modified the decision of the appellate division and
held that the prosecution is entitled to inspect the statement of a
witness testifying for the defense and use it in cross-examining the
witness. The reason given was that such a practice is permissible
within trial discovery principles, and its use did not intrude on de3
fense counsel's privacy or hinder the conduct of the defense.
At common law, criminal discovery4 was generally unavailable.5
Litigants entered the courtroom in the dark and the trial developed
1 Defendant Ulysses Montague

was indicted for assault and battery upon Newark

Police Officer James Nance, in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:90-4 (1969), and for
threatening the life of Officer Nance by pointing a revolver at him contrary to N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-8 (1969). Defendant was found guilty of both offenses and received
consecutive prison sentences of 1-2 years on the threat to life charge and 2-3 years on
the assault and battery charge. (The opinion of the trial court is unreported).
2 State v. Montague, 101 N.J. Super. 483, 244 A.2d 699 (App. Div. 1968). There the
court reversed on the grounds that the trial judge committed reversible error in
requiring defense counsel to produce a copy of the witness' unsigned statement and in
permitting the prosecution to use the statement in cross-examining the witness. The
appellate division described the statement as defense counsel's notes of his interview
with the witness, found no specific court rule authorizing the trial judge's ruling that
they be produced for purposes of the prosecutor's cross-examination, held that while
State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958), permitted discovery of the notes of the
state's witnesses, it was inapplicable to the notes of the defense witness taken by
defense counsel, and concluded that they constituted work product within the principle
against discovery in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The court recognized that
Hickman was a civil case but felt its underlying motivations were "equally applicable to
the setting of a criminal case." 101 N.J. Super. at 488, 244 A.2d at 702.
3 State v. Montague, 55 N.J. 387, 403, 262 A.2d 398, 406 (1970).
4 Traditionally, the term discovery has been held to include oral and written
depositions of parties and witnesses, interrogatories to adverse parties, notices for
inspection and copying, physical and mental examinations, and demands for admissions.
However, discovery would be more realistically defined as embracing all available
devices of fact ascertainment. Thus, in a criminal case, such things as the identity of
witnesses' statements made at preliminary hearings, and scientific data collected by
police laboratories, would be proper subjects for discovery. Louisell, Criminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56, 61 (1961).
5 See, e.g., King v. Holland, 4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1792). It would
appear that the common law judges were unable to conceive of the granting of discovery
in a criminal case, and deemed it unnecessary to give a principled justification for
denial of requests for discovery by the defendant, other than saying that there was no
precedent for so doing.
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into a battle of legal wit and tactics rather than a search for truth.6
The growth of discovery in contemporary systems of criminal procedure had been resisted on the grounds that it would further enhance
the already disproportionate procedural advantages enjoyed by the
defendant, facilitate subornation of perjury and fabrication of evidence," and enable the prosecution to encroach upon the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination. 9 New Jersey, too, had little criminal discovery until its judicial composition was revamped and
equipped with rules embodying modern discovery principles. 10
Since their adoption in 1948, New Jersey's civil practice rules
have been liberally applied with an awareness that the interests of
truth and justice are fostered by broad mutual discovery before trial.11
6 State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 562, 206 A.2d 359, 360 (1965).
7 United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). In the course of his opinion
Judge Learned Hand said:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the
prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of
his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be
convicted when there is at least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to
pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been
able to see.
Id. at 649.
8 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953). Later decisions and rule
changes have rejected the philosophy of the majority opinion in Tune and its holding
is no longer law. See State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 206 A.2d 359 (1965); State v. Johnson, 28
N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958). The argument that discovery leads to the facilitation of
perjury appears to be, at best, questionable. The defendant who actually committed
the crime charged will remain silent or rely on perjured testimony in any case. The
argument also presupposes that the criminal sanctions against false testimony and tampering with witnesses are ineffective. The potential threat of perjury was also raised when
discovery was introduced into civil trials. Yet despite these fears, civil litigation does not
seem to have suffered from this innovation. See generally Speck, The Use of Discovery
in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1154 (1951).
9 State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 424, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910); 8 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961). With the exception of two states that provide
for it by statute, there is a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in all states.
10 See R. 3:13-3. In pertinent part it now provides that upon defendant's motion,
and absent a showing of good cause to the contrary, the trial court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect "any relevant records of
statements, signed or unsigned," by persons known by the prosecuting attorney to have
relevant evidence or information. R. 3:13-3(c)(2). It further provides in R. 3:13-3(d)
that, if the court grants such discovery to the defendant, it may condition its order by
requiring the defendant to disclose to the prosecuting attorney the names of persons
the defendant intends to use as witnesses at trial "and their written statements, if any."
R. 3:13-3(e) does not authorize discovery by a party of "reports, memoranda or internal
documents" made by any other party, his attorney or agents in connection with the
investigation, prosecution or defense, or "records of statements, signed or unsigned,"
by the defendant himself to his attorney or agents.
11 See, e.g., Lang v. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp., 6 N.J. 333, 338, 78 A.2d 705, 707
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In criminal proceedings, mutual broad discovery was held to be generally unobtainable in light of the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination embodied in the fifth amendment. 12 Influenced largely
by this circumstance, the course of New Jersey's criminal practice
rules differed from those in civil practice and did not originally include any pretrial discovery provisions. However, omission of a specific
discovery vehicle has not impaired the power of a trial court to order
discovery when justice requires, 13 and indeed, the inherent power of
a trial court to compel discovery to further the just administration of
criminal law has long been established in New Jersey. 14
(1951); Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 91 N.J. Super. 377, 220 A.2d 693 (App. Div. 1966);
Rogotzki v. Schept, 91 N.J. Super. 135, 219 A.2d 426 (App. Div. 1966); Interchemical Corp.
v. Uncas Printing & Fin. Co., 39 N.J. Super. 318, 325, 120 A.2d 880, 883 (App. Div. 1956).
12 See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 211, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (1953). Contra, State v.
Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 206 A.2d 359 (1965); State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Super. 414, 170 A.2d
830 (App. Div. 1961); Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr.
879, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213 (1962). See also Louisell, supra note 4, at 87-90; Goldstein, The State
and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1197-98
(1960).
13 See, e.g., State ex rel. Helm v. Superior Court, 90 Ariz. 133, 367 P.2d 6 (1961); State
v. Winne, 27 N.J. Super. 304, 310, 99 A.2d 368, 371 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 13 N.J. 527, 100
A.2d 567 (1953); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1850, at 395 (3d ed. 1940).
14 State v. Funicello, 49 N.J. 553, 231 A.2d 579, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 911 (1967)
(defendant denied delivery of witnesses' statements in advance of trial); State v. Farmer,
48 N.J. 145, 224 A.2d 481, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1966) (interests of defendant and
public required trial delayed to permit defendant to study reports which the prosecution
was required to deliver under discovery order); State v. Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12
(1966) (defendant not entitled to an order to compel certain state's witnesses who were
to be produced at trial to testify on depositions in advance of trial); State v. Trantino,
44 N.J. 358, 209 A.2d 117, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 993 (1965) (defendant entitled to pretrial
inspection of witnesses' statements); State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 506, 206 A.2d 359 (1965)
(defendant entitled to pretrial inspection of state's objective documents such as hospital
and autopsy reports absent showing by state that prosecution would be improperly
hampered); State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 195 A.2d 449, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1000 (1963)
(refusal to permit defendants to inspect those parts of doctor's reports containing their
confessions of crimes was not prejudicial to the defendants); State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219,
176 A.2d 1 (1961) (trial court granted defendant's motion for pretrial inspection of the
balance of witness' testimony before grand jury); State v. Murphy, 36 N.J. 172, 175 A.2d
622 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (defendants entitled to copies
of transcripts of testimony before the Waterfront Commission's secret hearings); State
v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933 (1961) (application
of defendant for inspection of statement given to police two years earlier granted in
absence of state showing that inspection would improperly hamper the prosecution); State
v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958) (trial court has inherent power to issue a
subpoena implementing a pretrial order for psychiatric examination of witness in
criminal prosecution); State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 138 A.2d 1 (1958) (reversible error in
refusing to allow defense counsel to examine notes on which detective based his
testimony deprived defendant of fair trial); State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761
(1957) (reversible error in the refusal to allow defendant to inspect testimony given to
grand jury and to use it in cross-examination of the witness); State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296,
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In the instant case, defendant did not contend that the trial
court's order for production of the prior statement of the witness
was violative of any privilege. Instead, he sought to rest on court rules
which, he alleged, prohibited the state from discovering a defense
counsel's notes of an interview with a prospective witness. 15 In response, the court noted that its rules contained no such prohibition
and indeed contained nothing specific with respect to the right of the
state to call for the production of a prior statement of a defense witness after he has testified on direct examination. 6 The court went on
to affirmatively recognize the right of the prosecutor to inspect the
prior statement of a witness, 1 7 and dismissed defendant's argument
that the statement was not discoverable as work product within
Hickman v. Taylor, s when it noted that Hickman did not enunciate
any constitutional principle and hence had no controlling force on
the issue before the court.' 9
Judicial precedent for discovery by the prosecution may be found
outside New Jersey. In Jones v. Superior Court,20 the Supreme Court
of California held that the prosecution was entitled to pretrial discovery of the names of witnesses the accused intended to call in a rape
case, and any reports or X rays he intended to introduce into evidence
to support his affirmative defense of impotency.
Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept
confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state
has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can
throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest
in convicting on the teftimony of witnesses who have not been as
rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the
78 A.2d 568 (1951) (defendant did not have absolute right to pretrial inspection of his
alleged confession).
15 55 N.J. at 400, 262 A.2d at 404.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 400-01, 262 A.2d at 405.

329 U.S. 495 (1947).
19 55 N.J. at 401, 262 A.2d at 405. See Note, Work Product in Criminal Discovery,
1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 321 (1968). Hickman's main effect was to afford a measure of
protection to the attorney against pretrial disclosure of his litigation strategies, his
mental processes and the like; it has led to varying interpretations and much controversy.
See 4 J. MootE, FEDERAL PRA~ricE § 26.63 (1970); Note, Developments in the Law.
Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1027 (1961). Since it represents an exception to the
modern embracement of broad discovery as an aid to truth and justice, it is to be
construed very narrowly. Dougherty v. Gellenthin, 99 N.J. Super. 283, 287, 239 A.2d
280, 283 (L. Div. 1968). N.J.R. 4:10-2 affords a comparable privilege with respect to
writings obtained or prepared by the attorney "in anticipation of litigation and in
preparation for trial."
20 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
18
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evidence permits ....
Similarly, absent the privilege against selfincrimination or other privileges provided by law, the defendant
in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying the prosecution
21
access to evidence that can throw light on issues in the case.
In People v. Lopez,2 2 the same court approved the trial court's pretrial order requiring the defendant to provide the state with the
23
written statements of proposed alibi witnesses. In State v. Grove,
the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a trial court's order requiring defense counsel to produce a letter written by the defendant
to his wife while in prison. Even though the evidence in question was
a statement of the defendant himself, in contrast with the other decisions cited herein which involved statements of witnesses, the court
treated the question of self-incrimination in a perfunctory manner.
In accord with Jones is the New York Court of Appeals decision
in People v. Damon,24 where the court upheld the trial court's decision
to furnish the prosecution with prior statements of witnesses for the
defense.
These statements were not those of the defendant but of witnesses
offered by the defendant. In no sense can it be said that he is being
compelled to produce incriminating statements of his own. The
privilege against self-incrimination applies only to evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature obtained from the defendant
himself (Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S. Ct. 1826,
16 L. Ed. 2d 908; see, also, Jones v. Superior Ct. of Nevada County,
58 Cal.2d 56, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213;
Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 228, 246 n.; Note, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 838). We have
recognized the defendant's right to obtain and inspect statements
of prosecution witnesses for possible use in cross-examining them
(see People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 213 N.Y.S.2d 448, 173 N.E.2d
881, 7 A.L.R.3d 174). There is neither reason nor justification for
not allowing the People to procure from the defendant statements
taken from his witnesses for the same purpose of cross-examining
25
them.
21 Id. at 57, 372 P.2d at 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Jones has come under attack as
an infringement of the defendant's right "to remain silent both prior to and during the
trial." Smith & McCollom, Counterdiscovery in Criminal Cases: Fifth Amendment
Privilege Abridged, 54 A.B.A.J. 256, 259 (1968).
22 69 Cal. 2d 837, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963).
23 65 Wash. 2d 525, 398 P.2d 170 (1965).
24 24 N.Y.2d 256, 247 N.E.2d 651, 299 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1969).
25 Id. at 261-62, 247 N.E.2d at 654, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 834-35; accord, People v. Sanders,
110 I1l. App. 2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 124 (1969) (ordering defense counsel during state's
cross-examination to turn over to the state a prior statement of a defense witness did
not violate any attorney-client relationship or privilege).
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All of the above cited cases involved pretrial discovery, but access
to sources of information at the trial can be of even greater importance. As Professor Louisell has observed, "sound analysis probably
would be promoted by regarding discovery, both pretrial and at trial,
as presenting phases of a single problem." 26 In Montague, there was
no issue of pretrial discovery, nor was there any encroachment on the
defendant's right to remain silent. He had voluntarily offered the
witness to testify on his own behalf and the witness had done so. The
prosecution desired the prior statement during cross-examination to
ascertain whether it differed from the direct testimony. If so, its use
would be of assistance in the search for truth. Previously, defense
counsel had summoned and received copies of statements of the state's
27
witnesses.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has noted that cross-examination
was the most valuable safeguard discovered in the judicial search for
truth and, that if it is to be effective, there must be wide latitude in
testing the recollection of a witness. 28 As long as no constitutional
privilege is infringed, there can be no sensible reason for imposing
any restrictions on the cross-examination of defense witnesses other
than those applied to prosecution witnesses. 29 The court found no
infringement in the present case for, as was said in State v. Angeleri,30
nothing in the Constitution assures a defendant "a right so to defend
' 31
as to deny the State a chance to check the truth of his position."
However, this proposition is not adhered to on the federal level,
where discovery and inspection rights are embodied in Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In essence, except as to scientific
or medical reports, the rule does not authorize discovery or inspection
of statements of defense witnesses by the prosecutor. Similarly, the
Jencks Act,3 2 which provides that statements made by a government
witness to a government agent shall be the subject of discovery after
the witness has testified on direct examination, fails to make this a
Louisell, supra note 4, at 64.
Filing was done in compliance with State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. 514, 524, 138 A.2d
1, 6 (1958). The New Jersey Supreme Court there held that defense counsel was entitled
at trial to examine the prior notes of a prosecution witness and to use them in connection
with his cross-examination. The court's holding was grounded not on any specific statute
or rule but on the court's inherent powers to order discovery when justice requires.
See N.J.R. 3:17-1.
28 State v. Hunt, 25 N.J. at 524, 138 A.2d at 1, (1958).
29 55 N.J. at 399, 262 A.2d at 403-04.
30 51 N.J. 382, 241 A.2d 3, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 951 (19(k.
31 Id. at 385, 241 A.2d at 5.
32 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1969).
26
27
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reciprocal discovery vehicle for the government in a criminal prosecution.
The New Jersey Supreme Court perceived, and the justification
for the use of its inherent judicial power rests on this premise, that
the result in Montague was necessary to the proper administration of
criminal justice. No doubt the court was influenced by the broad discovery powers already allowed to New Jersey defendants. It is submitted, however, that a contrary decision by the court would defeat
the growth of mutual discovery which is essential to maintain a proper
33
balance of the burden sustained by the defense and the prosecution.
It has been argued that, as a matter of policy, mutual discovery
in criminal cases should be initiated by the legislature rather than
through a case-by-case development involving the inherent uncertainty
of a judicially created procedural system.3 4 It is foreseeable that private
defense attorneys can circumvent the requirement of producing written statements by "allegedly" taking only oral statements from their
prospective witnesses. This raises the question of credibility, for what
competent defense lawyer would elicit testimony from a witness without first having taken a written statement? However, such a shortcoming would not materialize where the defense is handled by the Public
Defender's Office, which maintains a permanent investigatory team
similar to that of the Prosecutor's Office, whose statements, in light of
this decision, would immediately become discoverable at trial.
Not discussed in the opinion is the questionable existence of a
true adversary system in New Jersey. Does such a system exist in our
state and, if so, does this decision effect an encroachment thereon? The
continued presence of an adversary system appears to be questioned
when a holding, such as Montague, demands broad mutual discovery
in the criminal environment. Supporting this premise is the proposition, embodied in our Canons of Ethics, dictating that the primary
85
role of a prosecutor is not to convict but to see that justice is done.
83 See, Goldstein, supra note 12, at 1163-92. As to the practice in Great Britain
allowing an accused virtually complete access to the Crown, see J. ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL
PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE § 40, at 1374-75 (35th ed. 1962); P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 112-16 (1958); Louisell, supra note 4.
34 Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d at 63, 372 P.2d at 926, 22 Cal Rptr. at 886.
See also Carr & Lederman, Criminal Discovery, 34 J. STATE BAR OF CAL. 23, 30-31 (1959).

85 N.J. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5, THE DEFENSE OR PROSECUTION OF
THOSE ACCUSED OF CRIME:

It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of
crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise
innocent persons, victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied proper
defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound by all fair and
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Does there not exist a reciprocal responsibility on a defense counsel
in light of his primary role as an officer of the court? Logic impels
doubt as to whether the ends of justice and the search for truth are
perpetuated by proceedings not implementing the full ramifications of
this holding. State v. Montague adequately remedies one of the more
glaring deficiencies of the adversary system through a liberalization
of criminal discovery procedure similar to that presently existing in
civil practice.
Anthony J. Fusco, Jr.
honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to
the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict, but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.

